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In the past few years, viral videos and commentaries have shed 
light on a long-existing but previously under-recorded problem — 
frivolous race-based police calls.  For example, in Philadelphia, police 
arrested two Black men, Donte Robinson and Rashon Nelson, in a 
Starbucks after a White manager called 911 because the men did not 
order anything immediately upon entering the establishment.1  In 
Oakland, a White woman called the police on a Black family 
barbecuing.2  In a different incident in San Francisco, a White woman 
called the police on a Black mother and her eight-year-old child 
because the two were selling water outside, apparently without a 
permit.3  Another White woman physically assaulted a fifteen-year-
old Black boy and threatened to call the police on him at a local pool 
in South Carolina.4 
In addition to these alarming events, a White student called the 
police on a Black Yale student, Lolade Siyonbola, for sleeping in a 
Yale University common room.5  A DoubleTree Hotel in Portland 
decided to fire two White workers who called the police on Jermaine 
 
 1. Hayley Miller, Black Men Arrested at Starbucks Said They Were There For 2 
Minutes Before 911 Call, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 19, 2018), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/black-men-speak-out-starbucks-
arrest_us_5ad8809fe4b0e4d0715dc393 [https://perma.cc/WS84-LDZC]. 
 2. Christina Zhao, ‘BBQ Becky,’ White Woman Who Called Cops on Black 
BBQ, 911 Tapes Released: ‘I’m Really Scared! Come Quick!’, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 4, 
2018), www.newsweek.com/bbq-becky-white-woman-who-called-cops-black-bbq-911-
audio-released-im-really-1103057 [https://perma.cc/3GT8-TBKG]. 
 3. Doreen St. Felix, The Summer of Coupon Carl, Permit Patty, and the Videos 




 4. Jessica McBride, Stephanie Sebby-Strempel, ‘Pool Patrol Paula’: 5 Fast Facts 
You Need to Know, HEAVY (July 3, 2018), heavy.com/news/2018/06/stephanie-sebby-
strempel/ [https://perma.cc/MA5G-2XMC]. 
 5. Brandon Griggs, A Black Yale Graduate Student Took a Nap in Her Dorm’s 
Common Room. So a White Student Called Police, CNN (May 12, 2018), 
www.cnn.com/2018/05/09/us/yale-student-napping-black-trnd/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/2EA6-XF2F]. 
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Massey, a Black man who was a guest at the hotel.6  And, more 
recently, a White woman called the police on a Black man, Devin 
Myers, claiming that he looked at her “suspiciously.”7  In a more 
proximate incident in New York City, a White woman called the 
police on Jesse Hamilton, a Democratic state senator campaigning in 
Brooklyn.8  Explaining the reason for her call, the woman stated — “I 
support Trump, and I see the difference between Democrat and 
Republican — and I see the difference between you and Trump . . . 
.”9  She then censured Hamilton for giving out pamphlets and 
“fighting back” against Trump.10 
These occurrences, which this Note terms “frivolous race-based 
police calls” (FRBPCs), have a long history within the United States, 
and comport with Katheryn Russell-Brown’s notion of the “racial 
hoax.”11  Racial hoaxes occur “[w]hen someone fabricates a crime 
and blames it on another person because of his race or when an actual 
crime has been committed and the perpetrator falsely blames 
someone because of his race.”12  Russell-Brown argues that White-
on-Black racial hoaxes are based on White people’s “imaginary” 
inventions of Black people.13  She notes that “[h]oax perpetrators are 
most frequently charged with filing a false police report,” but that 
“the number of racial hoaxes suggests that false police report statutes 
do not operate as effective deterrents.”14 
Russell-Brown locates the genesis of racial hoaxes within the 
external and internal images that the media creates through a 
 
 6. Soo Youn, DoubleTree Portland Hotel Fires 2 Workers for Calling Police on 
Black Hotel Guest, ABC NEWS  (Dec. 29, 2018), abcnews.go.com/US/doubletree-
portland-hotel-fires-workers-calling-police-black/story?id=60066428 
[https://perma.cc/E6MG-SAR9]. 
 7. Marina Pitofsky, White Woman Calls Police on Black Man Looking for 
Parking, Says He Looked ‘Suspiciously’ at Her, HILL (Aug. 16, 2019), 
https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/457673-white-woman-calls-police-
on-black-man-looking-for-parking-says [https://perma.cc/GE2N-EHRX]. 
 8. Dominique Mosbergen, NY Lawmaker Wants to Make Calling Cops on 
Innocent Black People a Hate Crime,  HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 20, 2018), 
www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/911-discrimination-law-jesse-hamilton-new-
york_us_5b796dbfe4b0a5b1febc2632 [https://perma.cc/4XYB-3H6G]. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See generally KATHERYN RUSSELL-BROWN, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL 
HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER 
MACROAGGRESSIONS (1998) [hereinafter RUSSELL-BROWN, THE COLOR OF CRIME]. 
 12. Id. at 70 (emphasis added). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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fictionalized reality about Black people.15  She points out that, on the 
one hand, “Blacks are regularly portrayed as lawyers, doctors, nurses, 
police officers, and best friends.”16  On the other hand, several trends 
have emerged other trends that “revert to crude one-dimensional 
images of Blackness.”17  Russell-Brown notes — as images of 
fictionalized Black deviancy — talk shows that portray Black people 
as amoral buffoons; sitcoms that portray the “comical relief” 
caricature of Black manhood; “reality” police television programs 
that showcase Black criminals; and the news.18  Russell-Brown 
analyzes more than 100 racial-hoax cases beginning in 1987, 
identifying stark disparities among hoax perpetrators.19  
Approximately two-thirds of hoax perpetrators are White, she 
writes.20  She also points out that “[p]eople carry out racial hoaxes for 
all sorts of reasons — serious, mundane, or even silly.”21  For this 
Note’s purposes, it is important to take note of the racial disparities 
that Russell-Brown highlights and to limit the scope of analysis to 
White-on-Black FRBPCs. 
In line with Russell-Brown’s analysis, this Note takes seriously the 
cultural and social mechanisms by which Blackness is converted into a 
symbol of deviance and criminality.  This Note also considers the 
structural legal mechanisms by which Black people are policed as 
deviant and criminal.  However, this Note departs from Russell-
Brown by positing that, unlike racial hoaxes, frivolous race-based 
police calls do not always require: (1) fabricating a crime; or (2) 
falsely blaming an actual crime on someone else because of the 
person’s race.22  Instead, this Note asserts that FRBPCs occur simply 
when a person calls the police on an individual because of that 
individual’s real or perceived racial identity, when said individual is 
engaged in quotidian activities — everyday tasks such as sleeping, 
 
 15. Id. at 1. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 2. 
 19. Katheryn Russell-Brown, As Racial Hoaxes Go, Jussie Smollett’s Case Is a 
Strange One, ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 2019) [hereinafter Russell-Brown, As Racial 
Hoaxes Go], https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/02/jussie-smollett-and-
long-history-racial-hoaxes/583498/ [https://perma.cc/9WPW-RRCK]. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. RUSSELL-BROWN, THE COLOR OF CRIME, supra note 11, at 70. 
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walking, and playing in the park — that, under most circumstances, 
would not be considered criminal.23 
It is also worth highlighting that this Note’s focus is distinct from 
the recent, and now-infamous, alleged racial-hoax incident involving 
Hollywood celebrity Jussie Smollett.24  The Smollett incident is 
different because, although Smollett was accused of perpetrating a 
Black-on-White hoax,25 his initial allegations referred to general, 
unidentified White people.  White-on-Black frivolous race-based 
police calls, by contrast, aim to regulate the lives of specific, 
individual Black people.  White-on-Black FRBPCs are particularly 
dangerous because they are rooted in acts of flagrant and subtle 
 
 23. See, e.g., Erin E. Evans & The Associated Press, Black Attorney Says Deputy 
Thought He Was a Suspect and Detained Him at Court, NBC NEWS (Mar. 27, 2019), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/black-attorney-says-deputy-detained-him-
court-because-he-thought-n988111 [https://perma.cc/E86U-75CN] (reporting that a 
Maryland Sheriff’s Deputy detained a Black lawyer in County Courthouse because 
the deputy thought the lawyer was a suspect). Although this incident does not involve 
a private citizen making a frivolous race-based call, it is important to note that such 
incidents are equally reprehensible and reinscribe the notion that Black people are 
criminal. Id. 
 24. See Dorany Pineda, A Timeline of How the Jussie Smollett Case Unfolded, 
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/la-et-jussie-
smollett-timeline-of-events-20190221-story.html [https://perma.cc/U3DA-G9YY] 
(noting that Jussie Smollett was arrested by police after allegedly faking a hate crime 
against himself in Chicago). Smollett is biracial, gay, and a prominent actor, who until 
recently, was known for his activism and justice work. Id. The alleged attack on 
Smollett initially gained widespread media attention after he claimed that two people 
yelling racial and homophobic slurs approached him as he was walking in Chicago’s 
Streeterville neighborhood at 2 a.m. Id. Smollett claimed that the men hit him, 
poured an unknown chemical substance on him and wrapped a rope around his neck. 
Id. He further claimed that the attackers referred to “MAGA country” during the 
attack, an apparent invocation of Donald Trump’s “Make America Great Again” 
campaign slogan. Id. 
 25. John Blake, Jussie Smollet’s Race Card Is about to Be Declined, CNN (Feb. 
24, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/24/us/smollett-race-blake-analysis/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/3369-7SL7] (comparing Jussie’s performance of Blackness to the 
likes of O.J. Simpson and other celebrities). Blake writes, “Simpson was able to rally 
support for himself during and after his murder trial by ‘deciding to become a black 
man.’” Id. He adds:  
Smollett . . . claimed [to be the] victim of white racism and gained initial 
support from black leaders. But in a new era where Donald Trump is in the 
Oval Office, Bill Cosby is in jail and R&B singer R. Kelly is headed to court, 
Smollett may soon learn that the rules have changed for black celebrities 
caught in deep legal trouble. 
Id. (citing Avis Thomas-Lester, O.J.? Oh, Brother! I Can’t Believe Black Folks Are 
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exclusion that ultimately relegate Black individuals to geographical 
confinement. 
This Note posits that White supremacy and anti-Blackness function 
both as psycho-spiritual and structural evils.  The term “structural” 
refers to historical and contemporaneous legal mechanisms — 
including statutes, ordinances, formal and informal policies, and 
judicial decisions — that have caused legal harm and physical loss to 
Black people by denying them access to full citizenship and humanity 
under U.S. law.  The term “psycho-spiritual” refers to a particular 
type of theological harm that extends beyond the psychological 
impacts of racial stigma cited by cases such as Brown v. Board of 
Education.26  The term “psycho-spiritual” encompasses the spiritual 
and psychological injury caused by exclusionary White theological 
customs, culture, and spaces, which separately and cumulatively work 
to deny Black people access to divinity. 
In order to remediate the problem, the law must do more than 
challenge legalized White space.  It must challenge the theological 
deification of White bodies.  Examining the theological treatment of 
Whiteness as sacred helps to illuminate why FRBPCs are so difficult 
to address and how the deification of White bodies is embedded in 
America’s moral and civic national identity.  A theological 
examination also lays the groundwork for devising a civil action that 
addresses the psycho-spiritual component of White supremacy and 
anti-Blackness.  Incorporating theological analysis more effectively 
highlights the group-based injury that Black people experience as a 
result of FRBPCs and can help to eradicate the imprisoning remnants 
of White supremacy and anti-Blackness.  Additionally, crafting a legal 
remedy that recognizes the need for psycho-spiritual “repentance”27 
affirms Black people’s humanity and their divinity, and works to 
divest White people of “their subjugating control over non[W]hite 
bodies.”28  In the event that such a law is not frequently enforced, its 
 
 26. See 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
 27. 2 Corinthians 7:10–11 (New International Version) (“Godly sorrow brings 
repentance that leads to salvation and leaves no regret, but worldly sorrow brings 
death. See what this godly sorrow has produced in you: what earnestness, what 
eagerness to clear yourselves, what indignation, what alarm, what longing, what 
concern, what readiness to see justice done.”). 
 28. KELLY BROWN DOUGLAS, STAND YOUR GROUND: BLACK BODIES AND THE 
JUSTICE OF GOD 69 (2015) (“By entering into the white space, and perhaps even 
thriving in it, a free black body contests the very notion of white supremacy. The 
ideology of white supremacy is maintained to the extent that white bodies continue 
their subjugating control over nonwhite bodies. The moment that this controlling 
relationship is subverted, the ideology of white supremacy is fractured.”). 
2019] RACE HAS EVERYTHING TO DO WITH IT 159 
aspirational quality suffices as a source of empowerment for Black 
people, and affirms their inherent value. 
Part I of this Note will discuss the longstanding history of White 
supremacy and anti-Blackness in the United States.  Part II will 
discuss the legal construction of White space as protected space.  Part 
III will discuss the theological construction of White bodies as 
protected bodies.  Part IV will examine the efficacy of current New 
York State law governing false police reports and hate crimes.  Part V 
will propose a remedy that includes theological discourse and draws 
on civil law principles, incorporating aspects of critical legal theory.  
The Note will emphasize the signaling power of the law, the need for 
normative policy, and the significance of White repentance and 
contrition.  Furthermore, the Note asserts that viewing the law as 
aspirational29 can serve public education purposes, address explicit 
and implicit biases, and has the potential to remedy omitted contexts 
and selective enforcement. 
I. ANTI-BLACKNESS AND WHITE SUPREMACY AS CONTEXT 
Part I focuses on anti-Blackness and White supremacy in the 
United States.  Section I.A provides meaningful definitions of the two 
terms.  Section I.B provides helpful anecdotes of racialized exclusion 
that resulted in Black geographical confinement. 
A. Definitions 
In order to fully understand the meaning of frivolous race-based 
police calls — which often occur in spaces that are not exclusively 
White, but are fertile ground for White dominance — it is necessary 
to contextualize the calls within a larger system of White supremacy 
and anti-Blackness.  Here, White supremacy refers to:  
[Not] the self-conscious racism of [W]hite supremacist hate 
groups[] . . . [but] instead to a political, economic and cultural system 
in which [W]hites overwhelmingly control power and material 
resources, conscious and unconscious ideas of [W]hite superiority 
and entitlement are widespread, and relations of White dominance 
and non-White subordination are daily reenacted across a broad 
array of institutions and social settings.30  
 
 29. See generally Mauricio Garcia-Villegas, Law as Hope: Constitutions, Courts, 
and Social Change in Latin America, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 133 (2004) (discussing 
aspirational constitutionalism in Latin America). 
 30. Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil 
Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1024 n.129 (1989). 
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 Anti-Blackness here refers to the definition offered by Charlene 
Curruthers, founding National Director of Black Youth Project 100,31 
who defines anti-Blackness as “a system of beliefs and practices that 
destroy, erode, and dictate the humanity of Black people.”32  The 
Note uses the terms “White supremacy” and “anti-Blackness” to 
indicate the way that the two phenomena have combined historically 
and contemporaneously to effectuate racial subordination and 
hierarchy.33 
B. Anecdotes: Exclusion Resulting in Black Geographical 
Confinement 
Rightly understood, both White supremacy and anti-Blackness 
have always had a geographical dimension, working to the detriment 
and degradation of Black people.  Early on in her career, Ida B. Wells 
had a personal encounter with anti-Blackness’s and White 
supremacy’s geographical component.  In 1883, Wells was forcibly 
removed from a train car because she refused to sit in the smoking car 
with other Blacks on her way to visit family in Woodstock.34  Dr. 
Emilie Townes writes that Wells hired a lawyer and sued the railroad 
for damages in 1884.35  Although Wells was initially awarded damages 
by a state court, the Supreme Court ultimately overturned the verdict, 
ostensibly because Wells’s suit was not made in “good faith.”36  
Wells’s forcible ejection exemplifies anti-Black geographical 
confinement in its most visible form because she was physically 
removed from what was legally designated as a White space. 
W. E. B. Du Bois articulates a different iteration of geographical 
confinement in The Souls of Black Folk, writing, “[b]etween me and 
 
 31. Full Biography, CHARLENE CARRUTHERS (2017), 
https://www.charlenecarruthers.com/about [https://perma.cc/U97A-HXQW]. 
 32. CHARLENE A. CARRUTHERS, UNAPOLOGETIC: A BLACK, QUEER, AND 
FEMINIST MANDATE FOR RADICAL MOVEMENTS x (2018). 
 33. Although this Note focuses on frivolous race-based police calls that are 
committed against Black people, it recognizes that White supremacy results in other 
forms of discrimination, violence, exclusion, and confinement directed toward people 
of color who share common, immutable characteristics. Furthermore, this Note 
recognizes and disavows all forms of discrimination, violence, exclusion, and 
confinement that are committed because of a person’s ethnic background, sexual 
orientation, gender identity, religion, color, nationality, ancestry, or language. See 
Tanya K. Hernandez, Bias Crimes: Unconscious Racism in the Prosecution of 
‘Racially Motivated Violence’, 99 YALE L. J. 845, 846 n.6 (1990). 
 34. EMILIE M. TOWNES, WOMANIST JUSTICE, WOMANIST HOPE 8 (1993). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 9 (citing DOROTHY STERLING, BLACK FOREMOTHERS: THREE LIVES 76–
77 (1979)). 
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the other world there is ever an unasked question: . . . how does it feel 
to be a problem?”37  According to Du Bois, “the problem of the 
twentieth century [was] the problem of the color line,”38 which 
functioned as a literal and figurative marker of the boundaries and 
limits of Black existence.  Du Bois reflects on his first encounter with 
anti-Black confinement, when a little White girl would not accept a 
card from him simply because he was Black.39  He writes, “[t]hen it 
dawned upon me with a certain sadness that I was different from the 
others; or like, mayhap, in heart and life and longing, but shut out 
from their world by a vast veil.”40  The “shutting out” to which Du 
Bois refers is not an anomalous experience but is rather the common 
result of anti-Black exclusion framed as subtle rejection. 
Malcolm X described similar experiences of anti-Black 
geographical confinement when he encountered White administrators 
at his reform school in Michigan in the late 1930s.  X states, “[t]hey all 
liked my attitude . . . . They would talk about anything and everything 
with me standing right there hearing them, the same way people 
would talk freely in front of a pet canary.  They would talk about me, 
or bout ‘niggers,’ as though I wasn’t there . . . .”41  Although X is 
permitted to physically inhabit the same space as White people, he is 
treated as if he was not actually present. 
Wells’s, Du Bois’s, and X’s personal stories highlight the 
adaptability42 of anti-Blackness and White supremacy as tools of 
oppression that survive by way of “preservation through 
transformation.”43  Both tools ultimately further racial subordination 
and enforce boundary demarcation.  These three narratives provide 
further insight into how subtle exclusion works in tandem with 
 
 37. W. E. B. DU BOIS, The Souls of Black Folk, in WRITINGS 363 (1986). 
 38. Id. at 372. 
 39. Id. at 364. 
 40. Id. 
 41. MALCOLM X & ALEX HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X: AS 
TOLD TO ALEX HALEY 30–31 (2d ed., 1999) (1965). 
 42. See generally Elise Boddie, Adaptive Discrimination, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1235 
(2016) [hereinafter Boddie, Adaptive Discrimination] Boddie criticizes the 
assumption in constitutional law that racial discrimination is siloed, static, and time 
limited. Id. Boddie argues instead that “discrimination is systemic, dynamic, and 
intergenerational due to its adaptive nature.” Id. Boddie further contends that 
discrimination adapts to law and to social norms that prohibit intentional 
discrimination. Id.; see also Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: 
The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 
(1997). 
 43. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 21 (2010). 
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explicit line-drawing in order to reinforce the invisible “color line”44 
in geographical terms.  These anecdotes are helpful for excavating the 
historical and contemporary function of anti-Blackness and White 
supremacy in regulating individual and collective Black life.  They 
demonstrate flagrant and tacit forms of exclusion that work to 
geographically confine Black people.  White-on-Black frivolous race-
based police calls, this Note argues, are essentially new iterations of 
these age-old problems. 
II. THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHITE SPACE AS PROTECTED 
SPACE 
This Part examines the structural mechanisms of the law, including 
statutes, ordinances, formal and informal policies, and judicial 
decisions which are used to maintain White supremacy and create 
White-only space.  Section II.A discusses the early iterations of the 
Slave Codes and the Black Codes.  Section II.B discusses the Jim and 
Jane Crow era.  Finally, Section II.C analyzes the post-Jim and Jane 
Crow legal and extra-legal mechanisms45 that work to maintain race-
based boundary enforcement. 
A. The Slave Codes and the Black Codes 
White-on-Black FRBPCs occur, in part, because the law has 
constructed White space as protected space.46  From 1619 to 1865, the 
Slave Codes — a combination of criminal and procedural law — 
“prescribed the social boundaries for slaves — where they could go, 
what types of activities they could engage in, and what types of 
contracts they could enter into.”47  The Slave Codes created a caste 
 
 44. DU BOIS, supra note 37, at 372. 
 45. Historical extra-legal mechanisms included lynching, intimidation, and Jim 
Crow segregation. Modern extra-legal practices include blockbusting and predatory 
lending. See Garrett Power, Apartheid Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation 
Ordinances of 1910–1913, 42 MD. L. REV. 289, 322 (1983) (documenting that, in 
Baltimore, threats included claims of building code violations if one tried to integrate 
neighborhoods, and violent actions by local populations). Power argues that local 
governments effectively sanctioned such threats and actions by choosing not to police 
them. Id.; see also NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., HOMEOWNERSHIP AND 
WEALTH BUILDING IMPEDED: CONTINUING LENDING DISPARITIES FOR MINORITIES 
AND EMERGING OBSTACLES FOR MIDDLE-INCOME AND FEMALE BORROWERS OF ALL 
RACES (Apr. 2006), https://ncrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/ncrc-oa-
prrac%20report%204-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/VH8M-4ZZG] (finding “persistent fair 
lending disparities for minorities” in home loan data). 
 46. See generally Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 
(1993). 
 47. RUSSELL-BROWN, THE COLOR OF CRIME, supra note 11, at 14–15. 
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system under which Whites, Blacks, and Mulattoes were accorded 
separate legal status and sanctions.48  Beginning in 1865, new laws, 
called the Black Codes, gave newly freed slaves the right to marry and 
to enter into contracts, but conversely imposed job licensing 
requirements, criminalized activities such as gathering after dark, and 
effectively granted legal exoneration to White supremacist groups 
like the Ku Klux Klan.49  Under the Slave Codes and the Black 
Codes, White supremacy had the full force of law. 
B. Jim and Jane Crow 
Later, in the Jim and Jane Crow era, anti-Blackness and White 
supremacy reared their ugly heads in the form of strict segregation 
laws that regulated Black private and public life and imposed “racial 
etiquette” requirements that required Black subordination to White 
authority at all times.  In addition to using formal Jim and Jane Crow 
laws to restrict Black living, White people also used private contracts 
called restrictive covenants to prevent Blacks from buying homes in 
White neighborhoods.  First introduced in the 1920s, restrictive 
covenants soon became the norm, and after World War II, many 
suburban communities required all residential subdivisions to have 
such covenants.50  One California covenant stated, “[n]o [N]egro, 
[J]apanese or [C]hinese or any person of [A]frican or [M]ongolian 
descent shall own or occupy any part of said premises.”51 
In Shelley v. Kraemer, the Supreme Court opined that racially 
restrictive covenants did not in and of themselves violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment, declaring that the covenants were a creative 
means by which to privatize acts of discrimination and circumvent the 
constitution.52   At the time, the reality of restrictive covenants would 
have been consonant with the Court’s holding in Plessy v. Ferguson,53 
which established the constitutionality of “separate but equal” public 
accommodations.54  The covenants would have also been consistent 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 19–20. 
 50. See James Loewen, Was Your Town a Sundown Town?: How to Find out If 
Your Community Intentionally Excluded African Americans, UU WORLD MAG. 
(Feb. 18, 2008), https://www.uuworld.org/articles/was-your-town-sundown-town 
[https://perma.cc/2J8X-U2UC]. 
 51. Id. 
 52. 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948). 
 53. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 54. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544–52. 
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with federal agency policy that permitted racial segregation.  For 
example, in the 1940s, the Federal Housing Act’s Underwriting 
Manual “praised restrictive covenants as ‘the surest protection against 
undesirable encroachment’ of ‘inharmonious racial groups.’”55  
Remarkably, in a departure from the racial attitudes of the time, the 
Court in Shelley found that, in granting judicial enforcement of 
restrictive covenants, the state courts violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.56 
Despite the Court’s wisdom in Shelley, the covenants and other 
legal and extralegal mechanisms57 cumulatively confined Blacks to 
urban ghettos.  Black families that attempted to escape the ghetto 
were forced to deal with “Improvement Associations,” which were 
founded to resist “the invasion of White residence districts by the 
Negroes.”58  Ta-Nehisi Coates writes that the borders of the ghetto 
were patrolled not just by government policy, but by the willingness 
of individual White citizens to resort to violence.59  The 
ghettoization60 of the city of Chicago, for example was not primarily 
the result of poverty, nor of individual choice, but was instead “the 
product of [W]hite hostility . . . .”61  As during Jim and Jane Crow, 
White-on-Black frivolous race-based police calls, much like processes 
of segregation and ghettoization, rely on White citizens’ continued 
use of privatized force.  Private uses of force are given legitimacy by 
law when White citizens enlist the police to enforce racial boundaries, 
and when the government actively participates in such boundary-
drawing.62 
 
 55. Ta-Nehisi Coates, Trayvon Martin Was a Victim of Black on Black Crime, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 16, 2013), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/09/trayvon-martin-was-a-victim-of-
black-on-black-crime/279691/ [https://perma.cc/AFZ2-XDY8]. 
 56. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 22–23. 
 57. Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New 
Answers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 451, 455 (2007). 
 58. Coates, supra note 55. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Priya S. Gupta, Governing the Single-Family House: A (Brief) Legal 
History, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 187, 192 (2015). Depleted cities, the Foreclosure Crisis, 
and racial disparities in housing are not the “natural” results of a free market, but 
“inevitable results of a century’s worth of deliberate policy choices, all of them aimed 
at inscribing a particular societal structure — the white nuclear family — into the 
physical landscape of American housing.” Id. at 188. 
 61. Coates, supra note 55 (citing BERYL SATTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES: RACE, 
REAL ESTATE, AND THE EXPLOITATION OF BLACK URBAN AMERICA (2009)). 
 62. See Gupta, supra note 60, at 194 (“The reframing of extensive government 
regulation and resource expenditure as merely supporting (rather than creating) the 
[housing] market has served . . . to obscure the huge role the government has always 
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C. Post-Jim and Jane Crow 
Post-Jim and Jane Crow, exclusionary zoning developed as a legal 
method used to construct distinctive, all-White, spaces and to enforce 
race-based boundaries.  Moreover, judicial enforcement is one of the 
primary modes of keeping the system of geographical imprisonment 
alive.  In one of the most infamous exclusionary zoning cases, Village 
of Arlington Heights,63 the Court held that the Village’s denial of a 
zoning request to create low-and-moderate income housing did not 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, in part 
because the Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation “ha[d] 
no racial identity and [could not] be the direct target of the 
petitioner’s alleged discrimination.”64  The Court conceded that the 
Village’s zoning denial would likely have a disparate impact on Black 
residents, but found that there was insufficient evidence to establish 
racially discriminatory intent or purpose.65 
In another case, City of Memphis v. Greene, Black residents filed 
an action against the City of Memphis and various officials, alleging 
that the City’s decision to close the north end of a street (West 
Drive), which traversed a White residential community (Hein Park), 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.66  The plaintiffs also alleged that the erection of the 
barrier violated their rights to access their property under a federal 
civil rights statute67 and that the closure was “a badge of slavery” 
 
played in exclusion in housing.”); see also Thomas J. Sugrue, The New American 
Dream: Renting, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 14, 
2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204409904574350432677038184
.html [https://perma.cc/Q6BH-43PK] (“It seemed that segregation was just the 
natural working of the free market, the result of the sum of countless individual 
choices about where to live. But the houses were single — and their residents white 
— because of the invisible hand of government.”). 
 63. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), 
superseded by statute, Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1972 (1965) (amended 
1982), as recognized in Chapman v. Nicholson, 579 F. Supp. 1504, 1507 (N.D. Ala. 
1984) (finding that “the Voting Rights Act and the legislative history surrounding its 
passage suggest that Congress intended to allow a cause of action based on Section 2 
of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973) without the requirement of a finding of purposeful or 
intentional discrimination”). 
 64. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 263. 
 65. Id. at 265–71. 
 66. Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 129 (1981). 
 67. See Greene, 451 U.S. at 102; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1972) (“All citizens of 
the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed 
by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and 
personal property.”). 
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under the Thirteenth Amendment.68  The lower court held the street 
closing invalid because it adversely affected the Black respondents’ 
ability to hold and enjoy their property. 69  The Supreme Court later 
reversed on the grounds that the record did not support a finding of 
“racial animus or an intent to discriminate on the basis of race.”70 
As Arlington Heights and Greene show, legally constructed White 
space as protected space is inherently tied to the idea of property.71  
In Arlington Heights, the Court reinforced the notion that the 
Village’s single-family housing restriction was not only permissible, 
but was the most desirable form of residential arrangement.72  
Furthermore, the Court completely dismissed the racial undertones 
embedded in the Village’s claim that rezoning would cause a 
measurable drop in property value.  While the Village attributed its 
fear of a decline in property value to structural incompatibility, its 
argument implicitly suggested that allowing non-White and/or low-
income residents into the community would cause property 
depreciation.  Given that the zoning denial disproportionately 
affected Black people,73 the implication is that Black-inhabited 
property is unmarketable and worthless, a commonly used racist 
trope.74  In Greene, the Court relied on similarly faulty logic that 
ignored the reality of racial segregation and the deployment of 
harmful racial tropes.75  In both cases, the Court erroneously relied 
on the faulty premise that anti-Blackness and White supremacy 
 
 68. Greene, 451 U.S. at 124. 
 69. Id. (citing Greene v. Memphis, 610 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1979)). 
 70. Id. at 135. 
 71. See generally Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political 
Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994); see also DAVID M.P. 
FREUND, COLORED PROPERTY: STATE POLICY & WHITE RACIAL POLITICS IN 
SUBURBAN AMERICAN 9 (2007) (discussing the “supposedly non-ideological market 
considerations” and investment “protection” purportedly driving White people’s 
desire to live in homogenous neighborhoods). 
 72. Gupta, supra note 60, at 238. 
 73. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 254 
(1977) (noting that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the “ultimate 
effect” of the rezoning denial was racially discriminatory and that the denial would 
disproportionately affect Blacks, particularly in view of the fact that the general 
suburban area was marked by residential segregation). 
 74. See, e.g., Wilborn P. Nobles III, Politicians, Pundits, Others Defend 
Baltimore, Elijah Cummings after Trump’s ‘Completely Unacceptable’ Tweets, 
BALTIMORE SUN (July 27, 2019), https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-pol-
trump-baltimore-reactions-20190727-rkn2npfghfgtdm4ikex77szjgm-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/RZ8M-QZUA] (discussing Donald Trump’s statements calling 
Baltimore “infested”). 
 75. Greene, 451 U.S. at 134–35, 144. 
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require outward manifestations of intent.76  Rather than considering 
the not-too-distant history of Jim and Jane Crow, the Court viewed 
race in an ideological vacuum.77  Both cases reveal that White 
property as real property78 is cherished, and that Black people are 
thought to destroy such property merely by living in proximity to it.79 
Cheryl Harris provides critical analysis about the relationship 
between White identity and property in Whiteness as Property.80  
Harris begins with an anecdote about her fair-skinned grandmother, 
who was able to (tres)pass as White and work at a retail store in 
Chicago.81  Harris writes that her grandmother “made herself 
invisible, then visible again . . . ”82 and argues that “passing . . . is a 
feature of race subordination in all societies structured on [W]hite 
supremacy.”83  In addition to maintaining that passing for White 
ensured her grandmother short-term economic returns and long-term 
security,84  Harris explicitly states that “American law has recognized 
a property interest in [W]hiteness.”85  Moreover, she contends that 
Whiteness shares some of the central characteristics of property, 
arguing that both “share . . . a conceptual nucleus . . . [the] right to 
exclude.”86 
After describing how Blacks were once themselves considered 
property, Harris turns to examine modern theories of property.  She 
explains how Whiteness meets the functional criteria of property,87 
stating that, although Whiteness is inalienable (meaning it cannot be 
transferred), that fact “should not preclude the consideration of 
 
 76. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265–66; Greene, 451 U.S. at 135. 
 77. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265–66; Greene, 451 U.S. at 135. 
 78. “Real Property is the category of property that is permanent and that is 
potentially subject to alienation or inheritance, the most common form of which is 
the ownership of land or any interest in lands.” Real Property, WOLTERS KLUWER 
BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY DESK EDITION 2238 (2012). 
 79. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 269 (“The impact of the Village's decision does 
arguably bear more heavily on racial minorities.”); Greene, 451 U.S. at 127 (“The 
residential interest in comparative tranquility is also unquestionably legitimate. That 
interest provides support for zoning regulations, designed to protect a ‘quiet place 
where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted . . . .’ and for the 
accepted view that a man's home is his castle.”) (citing Village of Belle Terre v. 
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974); Arlington County Board v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5 (1977)). 
 80. See Harris, supra note 46. 
 81. Id. at 1710. 
 82. Id. at 1711. 
 83. Id. at 1712. 
 84. Id. at 1713. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 1714. 
 87. Id. at 1731. 
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Whiteness as property.”88  She maintains that Whiteness is 
functionally property because: (1) it is based on the right to use and 
enjoyment (Whites use and enjoy Whiteness each time they take 
advantage of White skin privilege);89 (2) it is based on reputation and 
status property (calling a White person Black once constituted 
defamation);90 and (3) it features the absolute right to exclude (there 
are numerous cases where discriminatory policy is accepted as the 
norm).91  Harris’s conception of Whiteness and White identity as 
legally protected property is consistent with the holdings in Arlington 
Heights and Greene.  Because White identity itself is a kind of 
property that White people need in order to protect themselves, any 
and all space that White people occupy becomes bounded. 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig’s Policing the Boundaries of Whiteness 
underscores this point.92  Onwuachi-Willig maintains that the Emmett 
Till and Trayvon Martin cases are similar because of “their shared 
basis in policing the boundaries of [W]hiteness.”93  In both cases, 
policing occurred in a variety of forms, including: (1) maintaining 
White racial separation; (2) facilitating cross-class, White racial 
solidarity; (3) articulating Blackness, and specifically Black maleness, 
as a threat; and (4) regulating the presence and movement of Blacks 
in what sociologist Elijah Anderson has defined as “the [W]hite 
space.”94  In a similar fashion, White-on-Black FRBPCs are enacted 
by private White citizens, but are premised on the underlying 
assumption that all non-White people who pass and/or trespass on 
White space must be excluded, punished, confined, or killed. 
III. THE THEOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHITE BODIES 
Part III examines the theological treatment of Whiteness and 
explores how the deification of White bodies is embedded in the 
 
 88. Id. at 1733–34. 
 89. Id. at 1734. 
 90. Id. at 1736. 
 91. Id. at 1736; see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Policing the Boundaries of 
Whiteness: The Tragedy of Being “Out of Place” from Emmett Till to Trayvon 
Martin, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1113, 1125 n.52 (2017). 
 92. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 91, at 1113. 
 93. Id. at 1119. 
 94. Id. at 1119 n.24 (citing Elijah Anderson, The White Space, 1 SOC. RACE & 
ETHNICITY 10, 10 (2015) (describing “the white space” in part as “overwhelmingly 
white neighborhoods, restaurants, schools, universities, workplaces, churches and 
other associations, courthouses, and cemeteries . . . that reinforce[d] a normative 
sensibility in settings in which black people are . . . not expected, or marginalized 
when present”)). 
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United States’ moral and civic national identity.  This theological 
examination lays the groundwork for devising a civil remedy that 
addresses the psycho-spiritual component of White supremacy and 
anti-Blackness, highlighting the group-based injury that Black people 
experience.  Section III.A reckons with Whiteness wielded as 
theological power.  Section III.B confronts Whiteness used as sacred 
identity. 
A. Interrogating Whiteness as Theological Power 
Much like the law constructs White identity and White space as 
protected, theology and Christian doctrine construct White bodies as 
sacred.  Such constructions of the White body rely on Whiteness as a 
kind of theological power.  Reverend Dr. James Hal Cone articulated 
the reality of White theological supremacy, arguing that White 
theology is “an axiological perspective that contradicts the divine will 
to liberate the poor and the downtrodden.”95  According to Cone, 
White theology is “the predominant paradigm out of which both 
unconverted [W]hites and acquiescing [B]lacks work . . . . It identifies 
with the [W]hite community, seemingly placing God’s approval on 
[W]hite oppression of [B]lacks.”96  Because of White people’s 
domination in the development of Christian thought, Black 
theologians are tasked with challenging White theology, which has 
been, and continues to be, on the side of the strong and the powerful, 
and against the weak and the oppressed.97 
White theology reinforces White power because it uses images and 
ideas to “dominate Christian religious life and the intellectual life of 
theologians, reinforcing the ‘moral’ right of [W]hites to dominate 
people of color economically [and] politically.”98  Although Black 
theologians have consistently written about the harms of White 
theology and have invented subversive theologies of their own, 
evidence of White theological dominance is apparent in the twenty-
 
 95. JAMES H. CONE, GOD OF THE OPPRESSED 84 (rev. ed., Orbis Books 1997) 
(1975). 
 96. Marguerite L. Spencer, Subsidiarity and Environmental Law: Environmental 
Racism and Black Theology: James H. Cone Instructs Us on Whiteness, 5 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 288, 299 (2008) (citing JAMES H. CONE, A BLACK THEOLOGY OF 
LIBERATION 6 (20th anniversary ed.) (1996)). 
 97. HOWARD THURMAN, JESUS AND THE DISINHERITED 12–15 (rev. ed., Beacon 
Press Books 1996) (1949). 
 98. Spencer, supra note 96, 300 (citing JAMES H. CONE, FOR MY PEOPLE: BLACK 
THEOLOGY AND THE BLACK CHURCH, WHERE HAVE WE BEEN AND WHERE ARE WE 
GOING? 64 (1984); JAMES H. CONE, RISKS OF FAITH: THE EMERGENCE OF A BLACK 
THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION 130–31 (1999)). 
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first century.  For example, Kelly Brown Douglas recalls the 
controversy that surrounded President Barrack Obama’s 2008 
campaign when the Reverend Doctor Jeremiah Wright, Obama’s 
pastor at the time, was publicly lambasted for preaching against 
White supremacy and the mythical innocence of White America.99  
She writes, “[d]uring that controversy the [B]lack church as well as 
[B]lack theology came under attack. Both were essentially accused of 
not being Christian mainly because they called into question the very 
narrative of America’s exceptionalism.”100  The 2008 campaign 
controversy revealed that White theology is centered on the belief 
that White people have the unspoken right to determine what is good 
and what is not; what is Christian and what is not.101  It also revealed 
that White theology is centered on the belief that White power is 
God-power.  Stated differently, White people historically and 
contemporaneously have not just claimed the power to name God,102 
but have equated themselves to God.103  This tradition of equating 
Whiteness with God-ness is perhaps most evident in Protestant and 
Catholic iconography, which often portrays Jesus as White.104 
B. Interrogating Whiteness as Sacred Identity 
The theological construction of White sacred identity begins with 
what Kelly Brown Douglas calls the White Anglo-Saxon myth.  
Douglas traces the origins of the myth to the United States’ founding, 
pointing out that Thomas Jefferson had almost a fanatical obsession 
with Anglo-Saxon language, culture, and systems of government.105  
 
 99. See DOUGLAS, supra note 28, at 43 n.89. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 43. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Chris Riotta, Republicans Withdraws Support for Candidate Who Said, ‘God 
Is Racist White Supremacist’ and Jewish People Are ‘Satanic’, INDEPENDENT (June 
28, 2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/racist-
republican-russell-walker-god-gop-white-supremacist-antisemitism-jewish-satan-
north-carolina-a8421861.html [https://perma.cc/HY4X-VJT4] (noting that in 2018, a 
website tied to Russell Walker, a candidate for the North Carolina General 
Assembly, stated that “God is a racist white supremacist”). 
 104. See generally ALEXANDER JUNE ET AL., WHITE JESUS: THE ARCHITECTURE OF 
RACISM IN RELIGION AND EDUCATION (2018) (conceiving of White Jesus as a socially 
constructed apparatus — a mythology that animates the architecture of salvation). 
The authors argue that White Jesus was constructed by combining empire, colorism, 
racism, education, and religion, and distinguish White Jesus from Jesus of the 
Gospels, whose life, death, and resurrection mandates a love ethic. Id. 
 105. DOUGLAS, supra note 28, at 11 (citing Thomas Jefferson, Letter to the 
Honorable J. Evelyn Denison, M.P., in AMERICAN HISTORY FROM REVOLUTION TO 
RECONSTRUCTION AND BEYOND (Nov. 9, 1825), 
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Jefferson believed that Americans were “chosen by God to 
implement Anglo-Saxon system of governing.”106  Douglas writes that 
Jefferson, and later Benjamin Franklin, applied religious narratives 
about Anglo-Saxonism in a sectarian way that was not necessarily 
Christian.107  Their new ideology was about “the sacred nature of 
Anglo-Saxonism” and eventually became American civil religion.108  
Jefferson and Franklin’s secularized philosophy ultimately generated 
a myth of racial superiority that both determined America’s founding 
and defined its identity.  The myth “constructed cherished property 
and generated a culture to shelter that property, thus insuring that 
America remain ‘exceptional.’”109  Anglo-Saxonism became not only 
an identity marker, but the very core of what it meant to be an 
American, which was to be governed by White people, whose 
governmental institutions were considered superior. 
In 1775, the focus on preserving Anglo-Saxon governmental 
institutions shifted to a focus on the racial purity of the nation’s 
inhabitants.110  Franklin, for example, began to emphasize protecting 
“the language, customs, and complexion of ‘pure [W]hite people.’”111  
Soon after, two pivotal cultural events solidified the relationship 
between Anglo-Saxonism and White sacred identity: (1) the 
Romantic Movement, which highlighted the differences between 
peoples and resulted in the almost complete identification between 
God and humans;112 and (2) the quest for human origins in the 
nineteenth century, which helped construct a myth of “a specific, 
gifted people — the Indo-Europeans.”113 
Douglas explains that U.S. courts reinforced the notion that Anglo-
Saxon identity was special and distinct. In United States v. Bhagat 
Singh Thind, Bhagat Singh Thind, an Indian immigrant, petitioned for 




 106. Id. at 12. 
 107. Id. at 13. 
 108. Id. (citing ROBERT BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL 
RELIGION IN TIME OF TRIAL (1992)). 
 109. Id. at 4. 
 110. Id. at 17. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 18–20. 
 113. Id. at 20 (citing REGINALD HORSMAN, RACE AND MANIFEST DESTINY: THE 
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN RACIAL ANGLO-SAXONISM 33 (1981)). 
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high-caste Hindu, which meant he was Aryan and therefore White.114  
The majority denied Thind’s claim, stating, “[t]he children of English, 
French, German, Italian, Scandinavian, and other Europe parentage, 
quickly merge into the mass of our population and lose the distinctive 
hallmarks of their European origin.”115  Of Thind, the Court 
remarked, “[o]n the other hand, it cannot be doubted that the 
children born in this country of Hindu parents would retain 
indefinitely the clear evidence of their ancestry.”116 
In essence, the Court denied Thind’s citizenship because Thind did 
not appear to be White and could not assimilate to Whiteness.  The 
case marked a seismic shift in American conceptions of the White 
body, Douglas explains, because Anglo-Saxon blood proved that it 
was able to “stand its ground against the threat of contamination . . . 
[and] had the power to extinguish [other] identities.”117  Thind laid 
the legal groundwork for the White body as exceptional and, 
therefore, sacred.118  Douglas explains that White bodies, which she 
describes as “castles,”119 carry this sacredness with them wherever 
they go.120  She maintains that, in its strongest form, the Anglo-Saxon 
myth was codified in the form of twenty-first century Stand Your 
Ground Laws,121 which are established to protect White sacred 
 
 114. United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923); DOUGLAS, supra 
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 117. Id. at 39. 
 118. Yazmine C’Bona Levonna Nichols, Charged with Impiety, When Black 
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 120. Id. at 42. 
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GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-in-
public/stand-your-ground-laws/ [https://perma.cc/PB3U-66KB] (last visited Nov. 1, 
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Laws, BILL RTS. INST., https://billofrightsinstitute.org/educate/educator-
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VB5Q] (last visited Nov. 19, 2019) (explaining that Florida’s Stand Your Ground law 
allows those who feel a reasonable threat of death or bodily injury to “meet force 
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identity and White property.  Taking Douglas’s theory to its natural 
conclusion, all public and private space becomes part of the White 
sacred identity.122 
Given the history discussed above, White supremacy and anti-
Blackness must be understood as psycho-spiritual and structural evils 
that work in tandem.  Thus, it is imperative that those who are 
invested in undoing the harms of Whiteness recognize it not just as a 
legally constructed category, but also as theologically constructed.  
The belief that White bodies are sacred implies the inverse: that 
Black bodies are dirty and need to be quarantined, killed, and/or 
controlled.  Harris writes, “[i]n the commonly held popular view, the 
presence of Black ‘blood’ . . . evoked the ‘metaphor . . . of purity and 
contamination’ in which Black blood is a contaminant and White 
racial identity is pure.”123  When contextualized against this backdrop, 
it becomes apparent that White-on-Black FRBPCs occur in part 
because a “free [B]lack body . . . threatens the very social order,”124 
by disrupting it.   
The next Part of the Note examines why current New York State 
law is an inadequate remedy for this existing psycho-spiritual and 
structural crisis. 
IV. THE INEFFICACY OF CURRENT NEW YORK STATE FALSE 
REPORTING STATUTES AND HATE CRIME STATUTES 
Section II.A of this Part identifies the individual and collective 
legal harm that Black people suffer as a result of FRBPCs.  Section 
II.B discusses the inefficacy of New York State false reporting 
statutes.  Lastly, Section II.C discusses the inefficacy of New York 
State Hate Crime statutes. 
A. The Legal Harm or Injury 
The adaptability125 of anti-Blackness and White supremacy make 
them difficult to eradicate.  These ideologies are even more difficult 
to tackle when they occur in the form of White-on-Black FRBPCs, 
 
with force” rather than retreat). Similar “Castle Doctrine” laws assert that a person 
does not need to retreat if their home is attacked. Id. Over half of the states in the 
United States have forms of “Stand Your Ground” or “Castle Laws” laws on their 
books. Id. 
 122. Nichols, supra note 118. 
 123. Harris, supra note 46, at 1737 (citing Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our 
Constitution Is Colorblind”, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 26 (1991)). 
 124. DOUGLAS, supra note 28, at 69. 
 125. Supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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because the law bifurcates potential redresses.  On the one hand, false 
reporting statutes exist to deter people from making illegitimate 
claims and wasting valuable state resources.  On the other hand, hate 
crime statutes exist to discourage people from committing prejudice-
motivated crimes and to protect potential victims.  In the first 
instance, the broad legal harm is the misuse of public resources and, 
in the second, the legal harm is discrimination or racial animus 
directed toward the victim.  Black victims of White-on-Black 
FRBPCs, however, experience a compounded injury, including but 
not limited to public embarrassment,126 psychological harm,127 racial 
stigma,128 and in some cases, arrest or imprisonment.  This injury is 
imported not only to the individual Black victim, but also results in a 
group-based injury to Black people as a whole.129 
 
 126. See Samuel Brenner, ‘Negro Blood In His Veins’: The Development and 
Disappearance of the Doctrine of Defamation Per Se by Racial Misidentification in 
the American South, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 333, 334–35 (2010) (discussing 
defamation per se by racial misidentification, which was historically recognized as a 
morally egregious tort).  
Between the first years after the ratification of the United States 
Constitution and the middle of the twentieth century, to the state courts in 
the American South and West (and in at least one state in the North) 
repeatedly found defendants in tort actions liable for having uttered per se 
defamatory (either slanderous or libelous) statements by falsely or 
mistakenly identifying individuals as ‘Mulattos,’ ‘Colored,’ ‘Negros,’ or 
‘Niggers.’ 
Id. 
 127. See Physiological & Psychological Impact of Racism and Discrimination for 
African-Americans, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (2019), 
https://www.apa.org/pi/oema/resources/ethnicity-health/racism-stress 
[https://perma.cc/6Y3F-ME4Q] (“[U]nique psycho-social and contextual factors, 
specifically the common and pervasive exposure to racism and discrimination, creates 
an additional daily stressor for African-Americans.”). 
 128. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (citing Belton v. Gebhart, 
87 A.2d 862, 865 (Del. Ch. 1952)) (noting that segregation of White and Colored 
children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the Colored children).  
The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of 
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the 
negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. 
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] 
the educational and mental development of negro children and to 
deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] 
integrated school system. 
Id. 
 129. Frederick M. Lawrence, Resolving the Hate Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox: 
Punishing Bias Crimes and Protecting Racist Speech, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 673, 
698 (1993) (stating that, in regard to hate crimes, “the victim suffers for being singled 
out on the basis of her race, and the general community of the target racial group is 
harmed as well”). 
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FRBPCs are particularly dangerous for Black people because they 
are rooted in private acts of force that are given legitimacy by law 
when White citizens enlist the police to enforce racial boundaries.  
This boundary enforcement relegates Black individuals to 
geographical confinement and, in some cases, literal incarceration.130  
Neither the existing New York State false reporting statute nor the 
New York State hate crime statute addresses the intersection between 
false reporting and racially motivated crimes.  The following Sections 
will discuss the inefficacy of current New York State law. 
B. New York State False Reporting Statute 
In New York, “false reporting” is a  third degree misdemeanor 
offense.131  The New York Penal Law states: 
A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident in the third degree 
when, knowing the information reported, conveyed or circulated to 
be false or baseless, he or she: Gratuitously reports to a law 
enforcement officer or agency (a) the alleged occurrence of an 
offense or incident which did not in fact occur; or (b) an allegedly 
impending occurrence of an offense or incident which in fact is not 
about to occur; or (c) false information relating to an actual offense 
or incident or to the alleged implication of some person therein.132 
 In Daas v. Pearson, a New York State Supreme Court denied a 
defendant’s motion to dismiss a false reporting claim, reasoning that 
 
 130. See Ray Sanchez & Steve Almasy, Spike Lee Explains Expletive-Filled 
Gentrification Rant, CNN (Feb. 27, 2014), https://www.cnn.com/2014/02/26/us/new-
york-spike-lee-gentrification/index.html [https://perma.cc/H79G-94J2]; see also 
Daniel Kay Hertz, How Segregated Is New York City?, DANIELKAYHERTZ.COM 
(April 14, 2014), https://danielkayhertz.com/2014/04/14/how-segregated-is-new-york-
city/ [https://perma.cc/GYG9-LATM]; Yazmine C’Bona Levonna Nichols, Opinion, 
The Harmful Effects of Gentrification on NYC’s Low-Income Black and Latino 
Populations, BLAVITY (Nov. 14, 2018), https://blavity.com/the-harmful-effects-of-
gentrification-on-nycs-low-income-black-and-latino-populations?category1=opinion 
[https://perma.cc/PV76-Q5BE].  
 131. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.50(3) (McKinney 2009) (stating that under New York 
State law, falsely reporting an incident in third degree is a Class A misdemeanor); see 
also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.15 (McKinney 1967) (stating that sentences of 
imprisonment for a Class A misdemeanor “shall be fixed by the court, and shall not 
exceed three hundred sixty-four days”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.55 (McKinney 2001) 
(stating that falsely reporting an incident in the second degree is a Class E felony); 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.60 (McKinney 2001) (stating that falsely reporting an incident 
in the first degree is a Class D felony); Section 70.15, Sentences of Imprisonment for 
Misdemeanors and Violation, N.Y. ST. SENATE, 
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/PEN/70.15 [https://perma.cc/Q46S-K7PY] 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2019) (describing the sentences of imprisonment associated with 
each class of criminal misdemeanors). 
 132. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.50(3)(a)-(c) (McKinney 2009). 
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“[w]hile the violation of this statute may not be negligence per se, the 
statute does establish a standard of reasonableness of care and 
conduct.”133  The court went on to opine that “[w]ords constitute an 
act and words negligently or falsely and wrongfully uttered may be 
actionable under certain circumstances.”134  The Pearson case 
reinforces the notion that false reporting has harms beyond the 
economic consequences of expending unnecessary police resources.  
In People ex rel. Morris v. Skinner, the New York State Supreme 
Court clarified that the legislature intended for the word 
“gratuitously” in the statute to make the giving of false information a 
crime only where that information was volunteered and unsolicited.135  
The Morris case establishes that part of the reason why perpetrators 
incur liability is because they falsely call the police of their own 
volition. 
This Note defines a frivolous race-based call as calling the police on 
an individual because of that individual’s real or perceived racial 
identity, when said individual is engaged in quotidian activities 
(everyday tasks such as sleeping, walking, and playing in the park) 
that under most circumstances, would not be considered criminal.  
Some White-on-Black frivolous race-based police calls do, in fact, 
satisfy the criminal elements under the traditional New York false 
reporting statute.  In a case like the Starbucks incident — where a 
White manager called the police because Donte Robinson and 
Rashon Nelson did not immediately purchase items while inside the 
store136 — a private White citizen makes a call, knowing that the 
information is either false or baseless.  The White individual making 
the call usually gratuitously reports to a law enforcement officer or 
 
 133. Daas v. Pearson, 66 Misc.2d 95, 98 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Kings Cty. 1971) (citing 
Beauchamp v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 190 N.E.2d 412 (N.Y. 1963); Schmidt v. 
Merchants Despatch Tr. Co., 200 N.E. 824, 828–29 (N.Y. 1936); superseded by 
statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R § 214-c (McKinney 2003), as recognized in Caronia v. Phillip 
Morris USA, 5 N.E.3d 11 (N.Y. 2013); Major v. Waverly & Ogden, 8 A.D.2d 380 
(N.Y. App. Div., 2d Dep’t 1959)). 
 134. Id. (citing Jeremiah Smith, Liability for Negligent Language, 14 HARV. L. 
REV. 184, 189 (1900)). 
 135. People ex rel. Morris v. Skinner, 67 Misc.2d 221, 222-23 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 
Monroe Cty. 1971); see also People v. Oliver, 193 Misc.2d 250, 251-52 (N.Y. City Ct. 
2002) (“The presence of the investigators resulted from contact initiated by the 
defendant’s mother, an action set in motion by the defendant’s claim. Thus . . . the 
defendant started a chain of events resulting in police questioning and therefore was 
responsible for initiating police contact. Under these circumstances the initial 
statements by the defendant were made gratuitously and were not the product of 
solicitation by law enforcement.”). 
 136. Miller, supra note 1. 
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agency — meaning they give the information voluntarily and 
unsolicited. And he or she usually satisfies one or all of the criteria 
listed in § 240.50(3)(a)–(c).  In the Oakland barbequing incident, for 
example, Jennifer Schulte alleged the occurrence of an offense or 
incident which did not, in fact, occur.  She claimed that the Black 
family could not barbecue because using charcoal was illegal in the 
area.137  In other cases, White citizens allege the impending 
occurrence of an offense or incident which in fact is not about to 
occur.138  And in still other instances, White citizens may falsify or 
exaggerate information relating to an actual offense or incident.139 
But there is a wide array of other incidents that do not fall within 
the statutory definition of a false report.  In one case, two workers 
called the police on Jermaine Massey, a Black man who was a guest at 
the DoubleTree Hotel in Portland, Oregon.140  At the time that the 
employees made the call, they did not necessarily know the 
information to be false, as required by the false reporting statute.  
The employees likely assumed that, because Massey was Black, he 
was not a hotel guest.  Therefore, they wrongfully inferred that he 
was breaking the law by trespassing.  Similarly, the White student 
who called the police on Lolade Siyonbola, a Black Yale student who 
was sleeping in a university common room,141 likely subscribed to the 
same line of thinking and would not meet the requirement for 
“knowing the information reported, conveyed or circulated to be false 
 
 137. Zhao, supra note 2. 
 138. See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text. 
 139. See, e.g., Tom Steele, Woman Who Lied about Being Abducted, Raped by 
Black Men Pleads Guilty to Faking Evidence, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Feb. 23, 2018), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/courts/2018/02/24/woman-who-lied-about-being-
abducted-raped-by-black-men-pleads-guilty-to-faking-evidence/ 
[https://perma.cc/P24J-GGJS] (stating that Breana Harmon, a White woman, lied to 
police when she said she had been kidnapped and raped by several Black men. 
Harmon later confessed that she had been fighting with her fiancé and did not think 
their relationship would last much longer. She said she started cutting her clothes and 
herself, then made up the abduction); see also Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Race and 
Punishment: Racial Perceptions of Crime and Support for Punitive Policies, SENT’G 
PROJECT (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/race-and-
punishment-racial-perceptions-of-crime-and-support-for-punitive-
policies/#B.%20The%20Racial%20Gap%20in%20Punitiveness (“When asked for 
numerical estimates of crime rates, whites attribute an exaggerated amount to people 
of color. And when asked to what degree various racial groups are ‘prone to 
violence,’ whites rank people of color as more violence-prone than their own race.”); 
Russell-Brown, As Racial Hoaxes Go, supra note 19 (“White accusers are more 
likely to say they were victims of a random act of violence by a make-believe black 
offender.”). 
 140. Youn, supra note 6. 
 141. Griggs, supra note 5. 
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or baseless.”142  The White woman who called the police on the Black 
mother and her eight-year-old daughter who were selling water 
without a permit143 could likely circumvent the false reporting statute 
by arguing that her police call was neither a “false” nor “baseless” 
claim.  Although these incidents do not fall within the statutory 
definition of a false report, they should be understood within the 
FRBPC framework because they involve White individuals 
attempting to criminalize Black people’s presence in effectively White 
spaces.  All the Black victims were engaged in quotidian activities 
that, under usual circumstances, would, and should not, be considered 
criminal.  In other words, they were policed simply for being Black. 
In addition to the various inadequacies that have been identified, 
there is another defect within the New York State false reporting 
system: lack of data collection and selective enforcement.144  
Currently, there is no comprehensive database that documents the 
number and frequency of frivolous race-based police calls or false 
reports.  Although the New York City police department compiles 
yearly “Crime and Enforcement Activity Reports” that contain 
information on crime victims’ race and ethnicity,145 information on 
White-on-Black FRBPCs is virtually non-existent.  This is in part 
because police officers can use their discretion about whether or not 
to document each incident,146 and because they are less likely to 
believe a Black person who accuses a White person of committing a 
 
 142. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.50 (McKinney 2009). 
 143. St. Felix, supra note 3. 
 144. “White residents were more likely than Black, Hispanic, and residents of 
other races to initiate contact with police – for example to report a crime, a non-crime 
emergency, or to seek help for another reason.” Alexi Jones, Police Stops Are Still 
Marred by Racial Discrimination, New Data Shows, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Oct. 
12, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2018/10/12/policing/ 
[https://perma.cc/94RB-2W9Y]; see also RUSSELL-BROWN, THE COLOR OF CRIME, 
supra note 11; Hernandez, supra note 33, at 846 (stating that “bias incidents more 
often than not elude prosecution”) (citing Interview with John Fried, Chief of Trial 
Division within New York County District Attorney’s Office (July 20, 1989); 
Telephone Interview with Police Officer Walls, N.Y.C. Bias Unit (July 20, 1989) 
(most incidents are deemed prosecution-worthy cases by the police because in their 
experience, disfavored group community members do not make frivolous claims 
about such attacks)); Russell-Brown, As Racial Hoaxes Go, supra note 19. 
 145. See generally Crime and Enforcement Activity Reports, N.Y.C. POLICE 
DEP’T, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/stats/reports-analysis/crime-enf.page 
[https://perma.cc/TR4E-3KU2] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). 
 146. See Tom Tyler, Police Discretion in the 21st Century Surveillance State, 2016 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 579, 585 (2016) (“While past discussions focus on police discretion 
concerning whether to cite or arrest people, officers have equally broad discretion 
concerning how they treat the members of the public with whom they deal, i.e. 
whether they are respectful, whether they explain their decisions.”). 
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bias crime.147  This problem of selective enforcement and under-
documentation likely arises for two reasons: (1) the officer may have 
a shared perception with the White caller and therefore elect to 
remove the Black person from the space; or (2) the officer may 
diffuse the situation altogether, eliminating the need to log the 
incident as a false report or frivolous call.  As it is currently written, 
the New York false reporting statute does not effectively curb FRBCs 
because it contains glaring gaps that do not account for racially-
motivated police calls. 
C. New York State Hate Crime Statute 
New York State law provides that a person commits a hate crime 
when he or she commits a specified offense and either: 
(a) intentionally selects the person against whom the offense is 
committed or intended to be committed in whole or in substantial 
part because of a belief or perception regarding the race, color, 
national origin, ancestry, gender, gender identity or expression, 
religion, religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation of a 
person, regardless of whether the belief or perception is correct, or 
(b) intentionally commits the act or acts constituting the offense in 
whole or in substantial part because of a belief or perception 
regarding [the stated characteristics].148 
Although the hate crime statute ostensibly covers a broad range of 
prejudicially-motivated crimes, it is not particularly helpful for Black 
victims of frivolous race-based police calls, whose false reporting 
claims fall outside the statute’s scope.  In the case of FRBPCs, the 
White citizen’s act is both an individual offense to the Black person 
whose quotidian behavior is rendered criminal and a collective 
offense to the Black community at large because it engenders fear, 
and utilizes valuable state resources to regulate Black bodies. 
Similar to the false reporting context, the hate crime statute and its 
accompanying systems of collection are void of meaningful data and 
subject to the problem of selective enforcement.149  The New York 
 
 147. Katheryn Russell-Brown, The Racial Hoax as Crime: The Law as 
Affirmation, 71 IND. L.J. 593, 616 (1996) [hereinafter Russell-Brown, The Racial 
Hoax as Crime] (citing Laure Weber Brooks, Police Discretionary Behavior: A Study 
of Style, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING 140, 154–55 (Roger G. Dunham & Geoffrey 
P. Alpert eds., 2d ed. 1993)) (“The police are not likely to treat as seriously the claim 
of victimization of someone Black as they would a similar claim by someone 
White.”). 
 148. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05(1)(a)-(b) (McKinney 2018). 
 149. Hernandez, supra note 33, at 848. 
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State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) is an agency that is 
statutorily required to produce statistical reports,150 and each year, it 
produces a report entitled, Hate Crime Incidents in New York State 
by Reporting Agency.151  The report documents the number of hate 
crimes reported by each agency by county, but does not specify the 
type of hate crime committed.152  The agency also publishes the Hate 
Crime in New York State Annual Report, which details hate crime 
incidents that law enforcement agencies report to DCJS, including 
data on the number of incidents and type of bias reported. 153  The 
latter report breaks down the reported crimes into two categories: (1) 
Crimes Against Persons (defined as rape, robbery, aggravated assault, 
simple assault); and (2) Property Crimes (defined as burglary, 
larceny, arson, criminal mischief).154  Race-based false reports are not 
included in either category of hate crimes.  This is problematic 
because it leaves a gap in the law. 
The reason that New York State hate crime law fails to address 
race-based false reports is because FRBPCs involve elements of false 
reporting crimes and hate crimes, placing the calls outside of 
traditional legal analysis.  The traditional anti-discrimination 
framework unfortunately focuses “on the most privileged group 
members [and] marginalizes those who are multiply-burdened.”155  
This anti-discrimination framework marginalizes those Black people 
whose claims do not fall within strictly defined legal categories.  New 
York State hate crime law thus fails to acknowledge the 
 
 150. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 837(4)(c) (McKinney 2017); see also Criminal Justice 
Statistics, N.Y.S. DIVISION CRIM. JUST. SERVS., 
https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/stats.htm [https://perma.cc/U6BX-
MU6K] (last visited Nov. 19, 2019). 
 151. N.Y.S. DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., HATE CRIME INCIDENTS IN NEW 
YORK STATE BY REPORTING AGENCY (2017), 
https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/hatecrimeincidents2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T46L-LHQB]. 
 152. Id. 
 153. BRIAN DENVIR, HATE CRIME IN NEW YORK STATE 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 1 
(2017), https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/hate-crime-in-nys-2016-
annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RN7-E3W8]. 
 154. Id. at 2. 
 155. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, De-Marginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: 
A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and 
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.  CHI. LEGAL F. 138, 140 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, 
De-Marginalizing] (contrasting Black womens’ experience with dominant 
conceptions of discrimination, and arguing that “in race discrimination cases, 
discrimination tends to be viewed in terms of sex-or class-privileged Blacks; in sex 
discrimination cases, the focus is on race- and class-privileged women”). 
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intersectional156 nature of FRBPCs, which are premised on 
compound assumptions about race, class, and gender. 
Both hate crime and false reporting statutes are ineffective because 
they fail to address discrimination as an adaptive and malleable 
problem.157  Law professor Elise Boddie explains that, in the realm of 
constitutional law, the federal courts virtually “read racial geography 
out of Equal Protection framework.” 158  Courts almost never 
consider the meaning and import of racial geography in a claim of 
racial discrimination, instead focusing on the race of the parties and 
the state’s use of explicit racial classifications.159  Under Boddie’s 
proposed framework, courts would examine the meaning of a 
particular space and the marginalization of people of color.160  Just as 
in the constitutional law context, the New York State statutory 
framework, and state court interpretations of that framework, tend to 
focus “singularly on individuals and neglect spatial context.”161  Thus, 
existing New York State law misses an important element of racial 
harm.162  The current New York State false reporting and hate crime 
statutes, in failing to address the connection between false reporting 
and racially-motivated hate crimes, fuel the creation of vast 
geographical prisons, which effectively trap Black people in 
manufactured ghettos and render them immobile.  Even political 
leaders, like Jesse Hamilton, become prisoners in their own 
campaigning territory.163  These geographical prisons have 
psychological implications, too164 — Black children who merely want 
to swim at their neighborhood pool must proceed with caution, lest 
 
 156. Id. at 149 (comparing the compounding forms of discrimination that Black 
women face to an intersection, where traffic flows in all four directions). “If an 
accident happens in an intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any 
number of directions, and sometimes by all of them. Similarly, if a Black woman is 
harmed at the intersection, her injury could result from sex discrimination or race 
discrimination.” Id. 
 157. See generally Boddie,  supra note 42. 
 158. Elise C. Boddie, Racial Territoriality, 58 UCLA L. REV. 401, 421 (2010) 
[hereinafter Boddie, Racial Territoriality]. 
 159. Id. at 408. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 410. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Mosbergen, supra note 8. 
 164. See JAMES H. CONE, SPEAKING THE TRUTH: ECUMENISM, LIBERATION AND 
BLACK THEOLOGY 67 (1986) (“When I say that injustice is violence, I mean that the 
slum environment, the structure of the slum itself, works violence against those who 
live within it, even if they never experience the physical harm so often attendant on 
slum dwelling.” (quoting ROBERT M. BROWN, RELIGION AND VIOLENCE 35–36 
(1973)). 
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they be arrested and placed in actual confinement.165  Cumulatively, 
these incidents subject Black people to violent exclusion and relegate 
Blacks to the slums and the shadows. 
V. A NEW, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 
Section V.A of this Part briefly discusses Senator Jesse Hamilton’s 
proposal for a New York State hate crime bill and why its focus on 
intentional discrimination is misplaced.  Section V.B discusses why a 
meaningful remedy must address the psycho-spiritual and structural 
aspects of the FRBPC problem by incorporating theological 
discourse, tort law and criminal law principles, and critical legal 
theory.  In addition, Section V.C discusses a proposed alternative 
remedy, and Section V.D discusses the role of enforcing agencies. 
A. Senator Hamilton’s Hate Crime Bill 
After a White woman called the police on New York State Senator 
Jesse Hamilton,166 the lawmaker proposed a bill that would make 
calling the police on a Black person a hate crime.  Hamilton 
remarked: 
These 911 calls are more than frivolous.  These 911 calls amount to 
more than just a waste of police time and resources.  These 911 calls 
are acts of intimidation . . . . Living while [B]lack is not a crime.  But 
making a false report, especially motivated by hate, should be.  Our 
laws should recognize that false reports with hateful intent can have 
deadly consequences.167 
While Hamilton’s proposed legislation is a step toward much-
needed reform, its focus on intentional acts of discrimination will 
make it, and other similar solutions,168 subject to the same pitfalls of 
traditional anti-discrimination law.  Rather than relying strictly on 
 
 165. See McBride, supra note 4. 
 166. Mosbergen, supra note 8. 
 167. Id.; see also Press Release, Jesse Hamilton, Senator, New York State Senate, 
Senator Jesse Hamilton Announces 911 Anti-Discrimination, Anti-Harassment 
Legislation in Wake of Living While Black Incidents in Brooklyn and across the 
Country (Aug. 15, 2018), www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/jesse-
hamilton/senator-jesse-hamilton-announces-911-anti-discrimination-anti 
[https://perma.cc/2QTP-9NNH]. 
 168. See Jaweed Kaleem, #LivingWhileBlack: New Laws Could Outlaw Racially 
Motivated 911 Calls, L.A. TIMES (May 27, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-
na-living-while-black-police-20190527-story.html [https://perma.cc/Z43Q-BWXV] 
(noting that, in some states like Michigan, proposed laws would make it a “criminal 
misdemeanor to racially profile people of color for participating in their lives” and 
subject people behind those 911 calls to a $500 fine). 
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preexisting legal structures, this Note proposes that the law has 
signaling power apart from its actual enforcement169 and that 
remedies should be aimed at fixing the core problem — White 
supremacy and anti-Blackness, which are both psycho-spiritual and 
structural evils. 
B. Insights: Theology, Tort Law, Criminal Law, and Critical Legal 
Theory 
Frivolous race-based police calls are quasi-criminal torts that arise 
out of the unspoken social contract between individuals.  This Note 
proposes a meaningful legal remedy that addresses the psycho-
spiritual component of the FRBPC problem by incorporating 
theological discourse.  The legal remedy also addresses the structural 
component of the problem, drawing on tort law and criminal law 
principles, and incorporating aspects of critical legal theory.  The 
proposed legal remedy emphasizes tort law principles that aim to 
correct social wrongs, restore the moral balance between persons, 
“make the victim whole,” and impose civil liability on wrongdoers.  
The proposed remedy also emphasizes criminal law’s commitment to 
holding wrongdoers accountable for their actions using alternative 
community-centered sanctions. 
Although this Note relies on some core principles of civil law and 
criminal law, it recognizes that there are barriers to entry for potential 
Black plaintiffs, which suggest that a meaningful remedy should not 
be limited to the court system.  If the goal is not simply to punish 
White defendants, but to eradicate or reduce White supremacy and 
anti-Blackness, then an effective legal remedy must take into account 
the various benefits and costs of litigation, which differ depending on 
the Black victim’s class and gender.  It is here that critical legal theory 
becomes indispensable.   
Kimberlé Crenshaw’s concept of intersectionality170 cautions that 
the single-axis framework bifurcates victims’ experiences and renders 
 
 169. See Garcia-Villegas, supra note 29, at 133 (“A good aspirational 
constitutionalism is one that narrows the gap between desires and realities and, in this 
way, ends up being a strong constitutionalism of protection, or in other words, a 
constitutionalism which aims to guarantee rights in the present.”). 
 170. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: 
Thinking Intersectionally about Women, Race, and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 
1418, 1427 (2012) (“[T]here are many ways that surveillance and punishment are 
intersectionally scripted, including the ways in which race, gender, or class hierarchies 
structure the backdrop against which punitive policies interact.”). 
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Black women and poor Black people invisible.171  Crenshaw’s 
contribution compels us to consider multiple factors.  Civil law, for 
example, does not guarantee a right to counsel for either defendants 
or plaintiffs;172 the financial and time cost of going through a civil trial 
might deter Black victims from bringing valid claims.  In addition to 
the aforementioned considerations, a meaningful legal remedy must 
seek to avoid the pitfalls of the “intent” doctrine,173 which misses 
important elements of racial harm,174 and must address implicit and 
explicit forms of racial bias that result in selective enforcement.175  
Finally, the legal remedy must be aspirational.176  This means 
acknowledging that the law can serve public education purposes 
beyond enforcement. 
C. The Remedy 
This Note’s remedy includes some of the elements required by 
New York State false reporting statutes and hate crime statutes, 
focusing on gratuitous calls that are made voluntarily and/or are 
 
 171. Crenshaw, De-Marginalizing, supra note 155, at 140 (arguing that, “in race 
discrimination cases, discrimination tends to be viewed in terms of sex or class-
privileged Blacks; in sex discrimination cases, the focus is on race and class-privileged 
women”); see also generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. 
L. REV. 1241 (1991). 
 172. See Status Map, NAT’L COALITION FOR A CIV. RIGHT TO COUNS., 
http://civilrighttocounsel.org/map [https://perma.cc/D6XY-S2NS] (last visited Nov. 
19, 2019) (indicating that a civil right to a lawyer does exist for certain matters in 
particular municipalities; New York City, San Francisco, and Newark, New Jersey 
have a right to counsel for tenants facing eviction). 
 173. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987)(“Traditional 
notions of intent do not reflect the fact that decisions about racial matters are 
influenced in large part by factors that can be characterized as neither intentional — 
in the sense that certain outcomes are self-consciously sought — nor unintentional — 
in the sense that the outcomes are random, fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the 
decisionmaker’s beliefs, desires, and wishes.” (citations omitted)). 
 174. Boddie, Racial Territoriality, supra note 158, at 410. 
 175. Hernandez, supra note 33, at 850. 
There are three possible explanations for this lack of enforcement: the 
exclusion of disfavored groups other than Black Americans from statutory 
protection; unmonitored prosecutorial discretion; and the related problem 
of unconscious prosecutorial racism. Unmonitored discretion, coupled with 
unconscious racism and lack of explicit inclusion of other disfavored groups 
in the statute, allows prosecutors to: ignore bias crimes; not consider them 
serious enough for full enforcement; or refuse to realize that many discrete 
groups are subject to the same bias attacks as are Blacks. 
Id.; see also Brooks, supra note 147. 
 176. See generally Garcia-Villegas, supra note 29. 
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unsolicited.  Although the remedy mirrors some criminal law 
principles, it primarily relies on civil law concepts of restitution and 
wholeness, rather than the criminal law concepts of punishment and 
retribution.177  In circumstances where a White-on-Black FRBPC 
occurs (when a private White individual calls the police on a Black 
person because of that person’s real or perceived racial identity, when 
said Black person is engaged in quotidian activities that, under most 
circumstances, would not be considered criminal), the law should 
impose: 
1. A mandatory compensatory penalty or fine that is paid by the 
White perpetrator to the Black victim. 
2. A mandatory apology requirement.178 
3. A mandatory implicit bias and anti-racism training for the White 
perpetrator. 
4. A mandatory mediation between the White perpetrator and the 
Black victim, only upon the Black victim’s request and/or with the 
Black victim’s consent. 
5. A reporting and data collection requirement that includes: the 
location of the frivolous call; the total economic cost of responding 
to the call; and the race, sex, and age of the offender and of the 
victim. 
The first part of the five-pronged solution recommends an 
automatic compensatory penalty or fine, which has a long-standing 
history within the law.  Compensatory damages are often imposed by 
courts and government agencies as restitution for wrongdoing within 
civil law.179  And New York State criminal law already permits the 
 
 177. Contra Russell-Brown, The Racial Hoax as Crime, supra note 147, at 595 
(arguing that the criminal law should recognize and punish ongoing racial 
discrimination with the goal of bringing balance to the use of the term “race” as it 
relates to crime). 
 178. See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and 
Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 88–89 (2004).  
Remorse and apology could do much more than serve as gauges of an 
individual defendant’s need for punishment. Remorse and apology are 
fundamentally about social interactions and relationships. Serious 
wrongdoers sometimes apologize not only to the direct victim, but also to 
everyone who suffered indirect harm, such as members of the victim’s 
family and community. Victims, in return, can air their sorrows while 
expressing forgiveness to the wrongdoer. Ideally, this interactive process 
teaches moral lessons, brings catharsis, and reconciles and heals offenders, 
victims, and society. 
Id. 
 179. See generally Vosburg v. Putney, 78 Wis. 84 (1890) (imposing single intent 
and strict liability on the defendant – single intent being a minority rule because there 
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imposition of fines in false reporting cases that are classified as Class 
A misdemeanors.180  In FRBPC cases, a compensatory fine should be 
imposed on transgressing White defendants, and the amount of the 
fine should be determined by the appropriate adjudicator according 
to severity of the incident and as specified by the legislature.181  The 
law should consider, for instance, that a Black victim who is detained 
or arrested as the result of a FRBPC might be entitled to a larger sum 
due to her heightened injury.  The purpose of the compensatory 
penalty or fine is to “make the [Black] victim whole” and to 
compensate her for the injury that she suffers.  The penalty or fine 
would also serve as a deterrent to future White callers who might 
consider making FRBPCs, by signaling to them that the state takes 
the offense seriously because of its individual and collective 
implications for Black people.182 
The second prong of the solution recommends a mandatory 
apology and draws on theological principles of repentance.183  It also 
rests on existing, though seldom used, norms within the criminal law 
system that recognize the power and effectiveness of acts of 
contrition.184  Black communities themselves have noted the remedial 
 
is no mens rea requirement). If a defendant intended the harmful act, then the 
defendants is liable even if he or she did not intend the harm. Id. If a defendant 
intends the harmful act, then he or she is categorically liable, regardless of the mental 
element, subjective or objective. Id. Even though the extent of the damage was 
unforeseeable, all damages were awarded to the plaintiff. Id. 
 180. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.05(1) (McKinney 1999) (discussing fines for class A 
misdemeanors and violation). 
 181. Id. § 80.05(4) (“In the case of a violation defined outside this chapter, if the 
amount of the fine is expressly specified in the law or ordinance that defines the 
offense, the amount of the fine shall be fixed in accordance with that law or 
ordinance.”). 
 182. Although the proposed remedy raises Equal Protection concerns because it 
centers on Black victims, such particularity is justified because the harms differ 
between and among racial groups. While Black-on-White FRBPCs do occur, they 
occur so infrequently that their inclusion in the proposed law is unnecessary.  
Likewise, White-on-White FRBPCs, while they do occur, do not pose the same 
societal problems as those where the victim is Black. Both Black-on-White and 
White-on-White FRBPCs can be remedied using existing false reporting statutes. See 
Russell-Brown, The Racial Hoax as Crime, supra note 147, at 618. 
 183. 2 Corinthians, supra note 27 (“Godly sorrow brings repentance that leads to 
salvation and leaves no regret, but worldly sorrow brings death . . . .”). 
 184. See Michael M. O’Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and “Acceptance of 
Responsibility”: The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1507, 1534–40 (1997) (examining 
how on-the-ground rules and practices in criminal law treat expressions of remorse 
and contrition in administering criminal punishment). O’Hear describes how judges 
in most federal district courts tend to award acceptance-of-responsibility discounts to 
defendants who plead guilty and deny them to defendants who stand trial. Id. 
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power of public apology outside the parameters of the formal legal 
system.  In one example, after encountering Reverend Dr. James Hal 
Cone’s The Cross and the Lynching Tree and uncovering the 1940 
lynching of Austin Callaway, a Black community in LaGrange, 
Georgia founded “Troup Together,” an organization committed to 
investigating the county’s racial history.185  The organization, led by 
Bobbie Hart and Wes Edwards, wrote a letter to Police Chief Lou 
Dekmar, “describing LaGrange public officials’ complicity in 
Callaway’s murder.”186  Dekmar responded by issuing an impassioned 
public apology.187  When asked about the impact of the Chief’s 
apology, Edwards remarked: 
It was a real positive for the community to have the public apology, 
to have the [memorial] marker, to have the leadership of the police 
department and the city and our religious leaders all acknowledge, 
apologize, and confess that this occurred and place the marker at 
Warren Temple . . . . It’s now harder to silence that part of our 
history.188 
Although this Note recognizes that a statutorily-mandated apology 
may raise First Amendment concerns,189 it maintains that the 
mandatory apology component of the remedy closely aligns with 
historical and contemporaneous examples in criminal law cases, 
where judges have compelled defendants to issue public apologies 
and detail their crimes in court.190  Moreover, the mandatory apology 
 
 185. Benjamin Perry, LaGrange and the Lynching Tree, UNION COLLECTIVE: A 
MORE PLURAL UNION (May 10, 2019), https://utsnyc.edu/lagrange-and-the-lynching-
tree/ [https://perma.cc/MAH8-UVZD]. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Brad Schrade, In a First, Police Chief to Apologize for 1940 Lynching, 
ATLANTA J. CONST. (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/news/first-georgia-police-
chief-apologize-for-1940-lynching/feVIgQ6uJ0CMRnqwbdtKvJ/ 
[https://perma.cc/S6KK-4923]. 
 188. Perry, supra note 185. 
 189. See W. Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) 
(holding that the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and 
pledge transcended constitutional limitations on their power). 
 190. See Travis Andersen, Hearing to Resume on BU Rape Case Plea Deal That 
Left Judge ‘Baffled’, BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 9, 2018), 
https://www3.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/04/09/judge-stunned-proposed-plea-deal-
rape-case/uu0Rn7r3kPYu2tSX7REpXN/story.html?arc404=true 
[https://perma.cc/3JFY-2NYL] (“[A] young woman who was allegedly raped in her 
Boston University dorm room demanded a public apology from her alleged attacker 
[Samson Donick] . . . . ‘There’s an interest in holding people accountable for the 
crime, both out of justice for the victim and to prevent future violence, but that 
responsibility cannot lie just with the victim.’”); see also Fred Thys, Former MIT 
Student Apologizes to Assault Victim for ‘Inexcusable Behavior’, WBUR (Apr. 10, 
2018), https://www.wbur.org/edify/2018/04/10/samson-donick-plead-guilty-rape-case 
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component of the remedy addresses what some scholars have argued 
is criminal law’s minimization of the role of remorse and apology.  
“To remedy this neglect, we must focus not just on the individual 
defendant’s supposed badness, but also on the social practices and 
norms of remorse and apology.”191  An emphasis on repentance, 
contrition, and remorse is costly, but lessens the amount of money 
spent on other forms of retributive punishment.192  This Note’s 
proposed civil remedy can be adapted to fill the gaps left by the 
current legal system, and, in this case, is a well-suited remedial 
mechanism by which to compel contrition. 
The third prong of the solution recommends a mandatory implicit 
bias and anti-racism training for the White caller.  The legal system 
already imposes similar requirements on criminal offenders, ordering 
them to participate in community service programs,193 rehabilitative 
workshops, dispute resolution,194 and education reform programs.195  
The mandatory implicit bias and anti-racism training requirement is 
perhaps the most important component of the remedy because it 
actually holds the White caller accountable by making her reckon 
with her own implicit bias or racism.  It has the potential not only to 
change her individual behavior, but also to equip her with the tools 
necessary to have meaningful conversations with other White people 
and to engage in long-term anti-racism work.  This Note argues that, 
even in the event that the implicit bias and anti-racism trainings were 
to have no effect on the White caller, the trainings should be part of 
the proposed law because they have an important signaling function 
 
[https://perma.cc/P7BC-USBZ] (granting Donick’s plea bargain, the judge compelled 
the defendant to participate in a specific form of public speech: “As a condition of the 
plea bargain, [Judge] Sanders made Donick describe in open court what he did to his 
victim”). 
 191. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 178, at 89. 
 192. Id. at 146–47. 
 193. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.55(6) (McKinney 2019) (authorizing the use of 
community service as a sanction for certain offenders in conjunction with specific 
dispositions imposed by a criminal court); see also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 353.2(2)(a)-
(h) (McKinney 2019) (noting that community service sanctions and restitution can 
also be imposed by the family court). 
 194. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.55(5) (“The court may grant an adjournment in 
contemplation of dismissal on condition that the defendant participate in dispute 
resolution and comply with any award or settlement resulting therefrom.”). 
 195. Id. § 170.55(6-a) (“The court may, as a condition of an authorized 
adjournment in contemplation of dismissal, where the defendant has been charged 
with an offense and the elements of such offense meet the criteria of an ‘eligible 
offense’ and such person qualified as an ‘eligible person’ as such terms are defined in 
section 458-1 of the social services law, require the defendant to participate in an 
education reform program in accordance with section 458-1 of the social services.”). 
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apart from their actual effectiveness.  Furthermore, the trainings are 
consistent with tort law principles of wholeness.  That is, they 
exemplify a more expansive vision of what it means to make people 
whole.  In this instance, the trainings not only serve to restore the 
individual Black victim by imposing service on the White caller; they 
also have the capacity to help restore the Black community’s faith in 
the civil system as more than just an economic exchange. 
The fourth prong of the solution recommends a mandatory 
mediation between the White perpetrator and the Black victim, only 
upon the Black victim’s request or with the Black victim’s consent.  
Similar to the apology requirement, this component seeks to reduce 
or eradicate implicit and explicit acts of White supremacy and anti-
Blackness by compelling White callers to reckon with the gravity of 
their actions.  Like apologies, face-to-face mediations can be “a 
powerful ritual for offenders, victims, and communities,”196 rituals 
that the state could “facilitate by encouraging offenders to interact 
face to face with their victims . . . [t]each[ing] offenders lessons, 
vindicat[ing] victims, and encourag[ing] communities to welcome 
wrongdoers back into the fold.”197  Beyond the societal benefits of 
such mediations, Black victims would have a chance to confront the 
White caller who harmed them and would have the benefit of being 
able to share their story.198  Adjudicators and officials would likely 
also benefit from the wealth of information that would be produced 
during such a meeting.199 
Prong five recommends a reporting and data collection 
requirement that includes: the location of the frivolous call; the total 
economic cost of responding to the call; and the race, sex, and age of 
the offender and of the victim.  This component is necessary because, 
as discussed in the previous section on the current New York State 
false reporting statute, there is no comprehensive database that 
documents the number or frequency of frivolous race-based police 
calls.  Similarly, the New York State hate crime statute and its 
accompanying systems of collection are void of meaningful data.  The 
reporting and data collection component of the remedy will help to 
ensure that state and local governments not only track when and 
 
 196. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 178, at 90. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 611, 611–12 (2009) (arguing that victim impact statements are important 
because they provide information to the sentencing judge and help crime victims 
recover). 
 199. Id. 
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where the calls are happening but will also lay the groundwork for the 
development of analytical tools to protect against such race-based 
crimes in the future. 
D. The Role of Enforcing Agencies 
In absence of an enforcement mechanism, the proposed remedy 
would merely be a hollow shell.  Indeed, complaining parties and 
defendants need a forum whereby their grievances, challenges, and 
expectations can be managed.  The idea of having an adjudicator 
manage disputes between conflicting parties is consonant with 
theological principles of justice,200 and is also consonant with the U.S. 
legal tradition.  To this end, existing state and city agencies can play a 
valuable role.  In particular, the New York State Division of Human 
Rights (DHR) would be a fitting state agency to adjudicate FRBPC 
claims.  New York State is a pioneer in human rights, and was the first 
state in the nation to enact a human rights law, which affords every 
citizen “an equal opportunity to enjoy a full and productive life.”201  
The state created DHR to enforce its human rights law, and the 
agency’s mission is to ensure that “every individual . . . has an equal 
opportunity to participate fully in the economic, cultural and 
intellectual life of the State.”202  The DHR has the authority to 
vigorously prosecute unlawful discriminatory practices; receive, 
investigate, and resolve complaints of discrimination; create studies, 
programs, and campaigns designed to, among other things, inform 
and educate the public on the effects of discrimination and the rights 
and obligations under the law; and develop human rights policies and 
proposed legislation for the State.203 
In addition to the broad authority given to the DHR by statute, 
there are specific groups within the agency that are especially 
equipped to handle FRBPCs.  For example, the Hate Crimes Task 
 
 200. See Yairah Amit, Location in Canon and Name, in THE NEW OXFORD 
ANNOTATED BIBLE, NEW REVISED STANDARD VERSION WITH THE APOCRYPHA: AN 
ECUMENICAL STUDY BIBLE 355 (Michael D. Coogan et al. eds., Oxford U. Press 4th 
ed. 2010) (noting that the book of judges features a diverse array of leaders, and that 
Deborah and Samuel sat in judgment in the juridical sense). “The Hebrew word 
shaphat (‘to judge’) and its derivative shophet (‘a judge’) can mean to ‘adjudicate’ 
but also to ‘rule’ (2 Chronicles 1:10; Isaiah 51:5) . . . and ‘vindicate, provide justice 
for.’ (Psalm 10:18; 82:1-3).” Id. 
 201. N.Y. HUM. RTS. LAW § 290(3) (2014); Mission Statement, N.Y. ST. DIV. HUM. 
RTS., https://dhr.ny.gov/mission-statement [https://perma.cc/C6PS-P6NJ] (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2019). 
 202. N.Y. HUM. RTS. LAW § 290(3). 
 203. See id. § 295(1)–(11). 
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Force created by Governor Cuomo fights the increase in reports of 
bias-motivated threats, harassment, and violence.204  The Task Force 
is run by the State Division of Human Rights, the State Police, and 
the Division of Criminal Justice Services who work together to 
prevent, investigate, and monitor hate crimes and violations of human 
rights law.205  The Hate Crimes Task Force would be an ideal 
adjudicator of FRBPC claims because it has the power to review 
complaints and investigate cases with probable cause.206  Given that 
complainants can file reports online, Black victims would be 
empowered to seek enforcement against frivolous White callers while 
avoiding the costs of litigation and traditional barriers to the court 
system.  The agency would provide an effective factual inquiry and 
serve a quasi-prosecutorial function, through a formal hearing or 
some other adjudicative proceeding, and could impose a suggested 
financial penalty if it determines that a frivolous race-based call has 
actually occurred.  The agency also produces annual reports, which 
would fulfill the reporting and data collection requirement.207 
The New York City Commission on Human Rights (CCHR) is a 
city agency that can serve as an alternative208 adjudicative body for 
FRBPC claims.  The CCHR is charged with the enforcement of New 
York City Human Rights Law,209 Title 8 of the Administrative Code 
of the City of New York,210 and with “educating the public and 
encouraging positive community relations.”211  The Commission is 
 
 204. About the Task Force, N.Y. STATE HATE CRIMES TASK FORCE, 
https://www.ny.gov/programs/hate-crimes-task-force [https://perma.cc/H9PX-YD9J] 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2019); see also ANDREW CUOMO, HATE CRIMES TASK FORCE 
REPORT 3 (Oct. 24, 2017) [hereinafter HATE CRIMES TASK FORCE REPORT], 
https://www.ny.gov/sites/ny.gov/files/atoms/files/Hate_Crime_Task_Force_Report.pd
f [https://perma.cc/3KWJ-ZGMX]. 
 205. About the Task Force, supra note 204. 
 206. See HATE CRIMES TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 204, at 5. 
 207. Id. at 9. 
 208. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-109(f)(ii)–(iii) (McKinney 2018) (noting that a 
complainant is not permitted to file the same grievance with the Commission on 
Human Rights and the Division of Human Rights). 
 209. See generally id. § 8-101. 
 210. Id. (“A city agency is hereby created with power to eliminate and prevent 
discrimination from playing any role in actions relating to employment, public 
accommodations, and housing and other real estate, and to take other actions against 
prejudice, intolerance, bigotry, discrimination, sexual harassment and bias-related 
violence or harassment as herein provided; and the commission established 
hereunder is hereby given general jurisdiction and power for such purposes.”). 
 211. Inside the NYC Commission on Human Rights, NYC HUM. RTS. (2019), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/cchr/about/inside-cchr.page [https://perma.cc/7NJ5-XMN2]. 
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divided into two major bureaus: Law Enforcement and Community 
Relations. 
The Law Enforcement Bureau is “responsible for the intake, 
investigation, and prosecution of complaints alleging violations of the 
Law.”212  The Community Relations Bureau “provides public 
education about the Human Rights Law and helps cultivate 
understanding and respect among the City’s many diverse 
communities through its borough-based Community Service Centers 
and numerous educational and outreach programs.”213  The 
Commission on Human Rights, much like the Division of Human 
Rights, has the power to: hear complaints;214 conduct investigations 
and keep records;215 hold hearings;216 issue decisions and orders;217 
and impose civil penalties.218  Although the current administrative 
 
 212. Id.; see also Enforcement, NYC HUM. RTS. (2019), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/cchr/enforcement/enforcement.page 
[https://perma.cc/YLZ8-2H62] (describing the role and authority of the Law 
Enforcement Bureau). 
 213. Inside the NYC Commission on Human Rights, supra note 211; see also 
Community, NYC HUM. RTS. (2019), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/cchr/community/community.page [https://perma.cc/GNN7-
MAZE] (describing the role and work of the Community Relations Bureau). 
 214. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-109(a) (“Any person aggrieved by an unlawful 
discriminatory practice or an act of discriminatory harassment or violence as set forth 
in chapter 6 of this title, or such person’s attorney, may make, sign and file with the 
commission a verified complaint in writing which shall: (i) state the name of the 
person alleged to have committed the unlawful discriminatory practice or act of 
discriminatory harassment or violence complained of, and the address of such person 
if known; (ii) set forth the particulars of the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice 
or act of discriminatory harassment or violence; and (iii) contain such other 
information as may be required by the commission. The commission shall 
acknowledge the filing of the complaint and advise the complainant of the time limits 
set forth in this chapter.”). 
 215. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-114. 
 216. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-119(a) (“A hearing on the complaint shall be 
held before an administrative law judge designated by the commission. The place of 
any such hearing shall be the office of the commission or such other place as may be 
designated by the commission. Notice of the date, time and place of such hearing 
shall be served upon the complainant, respondent and any necessary party.”). 
 217. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-120. 
 218. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-126(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in 
subdivision 13 of § 8-107, in addition to any of the remedies and penalties set forth in 
subdivision a of § 8-120, where the commission finds that a person has engaged in an 
unlawful discriminatory practice, the commission may, to vindicate the public 
interest, impose a civil penalty of not more than $125,000. Where the commission 
finds that an unlawful discriminatory practice was the result of the respondent’s 
willful, wanton or malicious act or where the commission finds that an act of 
discriminatory harassment or violence as set forth in chapter 6 of this title has 
occurred, the commission may, to vindicate the public interest, impose a civil penalty 
of not more than $250,000.”). 
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code states that “[a]ny civil penalties recovered . . . shall be paid into 
the general fund of the city,”219 the proposed law should permit 
FRBPC victims themselves to receive appropriate compensatory 
damages. 
Both the Division of Human Rights and the City Commission on 
Human Rights are ideal adjudicative bodies because they have the 
power to ensure just outcomes through state and local government.  
The agencies could and should look to examples from private actors 
like Starbucks, which addressed the 2018 FRBPC incident that 
occurred at one of its Philadelphia shops by implementing a multi-
faceted approach.  The franchise’s response included: reaching an 
undisclosed settlement with the Black victims Rashon Nelson and 
Dante Robinson; offering to pay the two men’s college tuition; 
sending its CEO to issue an in-person apology; and mandating the 
closing of 8000 Starbucks stores in the U.S. on May 29, 2018 so that 
some 175,000 employees could get training in unconscious bias.220  
The agencies could and should also look to the City of Philadelphia’s 
response to the Starbucks incident.  To make amends for the 
unwarranted arrests, the City reached a symbolic $1 settlement with 
Nelson and Robinson, agreed to expunge their arrest records, and 
pledged to contribute $200,000 to create a counseling and mentoring 
program for Philadelphia high school students.221  The Starbucks 
example provides a model for what an enforceable legal remedy 
could look like, if such a remedy were adopted and applied to hold 
White individuals accountable for the harms of frivolous race-based 
police calls. 
CONCLUSION 
The interdisciplinary legal remedy outlined above problematizes 
frivolous race-based police calls as privatized, extralegal acts of 
discrimination and addresses the individual and group-based injury 
that Black people experience.  The five-pronged solution has the 
potential to eradicate or reduce the imprisoning remnants of White 
supremacy and anti-Blackness by recognizing the need for psycho-
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spiritual “repentance”222 and structural change within the law.  It 
embodies the heart of tort law principles by requiring White 
perpetrators to make Black victims whole and embodies the heart of 
criminal law principles by authorizing the use of community-centered 
sanctions for FRBPC offenses.  Lastly, the proposed solution 
incorporates intersectional analysis and valid concerns raised by 
critical legal theorists.  The proposed remedy affirms Black people’s 
humanity and their divinity by divesting White people of “their 
subjugating control over non[W]hite bodies.”223  In the event that 
such a law is not frequently enforced, its aspirational nature still 
suffices as a source of empowerment for Black people, and affirms 
their inherent value. 
 
 222. 2 Corinthians, supra note 27 (“Godly sorrow brings repentance that leads to 
salvation and leaves no regret, but worldly sorrow brings death . . . .”). 
 223. See DOUGLAS, supra note 28, at 69 and accompanying text. 
